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what people are writing about

BOOKS
The Great Wall Street Scandal
by Raymond L. Dirks and Leon
ard Gross, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, New York, 1974, 295
pages, $8.95.

Chutzpah—that Yiddish word
meaning unprecedented gall—is
what this book is all about. For the
Equity Funding case, unlike many
other scandals that have rocked the
financial world, was primarily a
triumph of deliberate deception by
the company—deception on so vast
and deliberate a scale that the
SEC, state insurance commissions,

other insurance companies, even
honest individuals involved in the
machinations, literally wouldn’t be
lieve what was going on.
Yet the deception took everyone
in, wary and sophisticated under
writers as well as gullible individ
uals. Everyone relied on everyone
else: the state insurance commis
sions, or the SEC, or honest and
reputable auditing firms. The in
surance protective agencies of the
various states did not check to see
that the policies really existed and
covered actual people. Nor did the
New York Stock Exchange. It was
the Captain from Kopenick story
all over again, the tale of the re

tiring German tailor who got an
Army captain’s uniform, assumed
it and the manner of a pre-World
War I Prussian officer, and very
nearly took complete charge of a
small German village. The facade
of Equity Funding was so impres
sive that no one checked to see if
there were adequate foundations
or anything behind the facade.
If any of the supervisory agen
cies, private or public, had even
checked the origins of Equity
Funding anywhere along the line,
the career of the company and the
catastrophic losses it caused, might
not have occurred. The company
evolved from the schemes of a mot
ley group of five promoters: Mike
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Platt, Eugene Cuthbertson, Stanley
Goldblum, Mike Riordan, and Gor
don McCormick. McCormick, a
Barnum and Bailey character more
notable for high living than for
any solid financial accomplish
ments, is generally acknowledged
as the author of the idea that was
to be the genesis of Equity Fund
ing.

“Every dollar works twice”
Life insurance is good. Everyone
needs it because of the certainty of
death. Yet in a time of continued
inflation, every dollar sunk in life
insurance premiums is a dollar lost
to diminishing purchasing power
in the future. Why not buy a mu
tual fund in large quantities, then
borrow against the value of the
fund to invest in insurance? When
the next fund policy payment fell
due, pay it from the profits on the
mutual funds. That way, every in
vestor’s dollar would work twice.
The holes in such a scheme
should have been self-evident. The
fact that they were not, to the
thousands who invested in the
scheme, speaks volumes about
American naivete and greed. It
speaks even more eloquently
about the diligence of the regulat
ing agencies that were supposed
to be overseeing both the insurance
and the mutual fund industries.
Finally, the conspirators who
hatched the scheme fell out. Platt
died of a heart attack in a New
York bar. Riordan was buried in a
California mudslide. Eventually,
only Goldblum was left.
Goldblum was a cut above the
others. Shrewd and intelligent, he
could be impressive when the cir
cumstances demanded it. He knew
insurance and he also knew mutual
fund sales.
And it was Goldblum who
capped the first concept: every in
vestor’s money working twice; first
to purchase mutual funds, then
through loans on the funds to buy
life insurance, with the final gim
mick. That was to run up the prof
its of the conglomerate selling both
funds and insurance to the point
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where it could afford to “purchase”
other companies, and to add their
profits to Equity Funding’s, thus
driving up the parent company’s
stock higher still.
But in 1969, with a general
downturn in the stock market,
Equity Funding’s stock fell too. It
no longer attracted enough eager
individual buyers to run its stock
to the point where it could be
traded advantageously for another
company’s shares. Trouble was
brewing in Paradise.
Strangely, the origin of this book
was a visit paid to the author by
a disgruntled employee of Equity
Funding who had just been fired.
The author, Ray Dirks, was a fairly
well known insurance analyst on
Wall Street. The ex-employee was
Ron Secrist, a vice president for ad
ministration for Equity who had
been working at an Equity subsid
iary in New Jersey. He was sud
denly summoned to Equity head
quarters in Los Angeles to be in
formed that he was being fired as
part of a general economy move.
What the company didn’t realize
was that Secrist had been suspi
cious of its way of doing business
for a long time, had exchanged
confidences with other employees
who also thought something was
very much amiss, and, at the very
end, had actually been involved in
some of the Equity machinations.
Together these scattered bits of
knowledge amounted to a whole
that was almost incredible. It
looked very much as though the
company were writing false insur
ance policies on non-existent peo
ple, recording them as legitimate
sales, thus inflating their stock fur
ther, using the inflated stock to
purchase legitimate companies, and
then looting them.
To do this executives of the com
pany would actually create false
insurance papers by simply copy
ing existing health records for one
legitimate customer, combining
them with financial information
from another and, in effect creating
an entirely new character. The
work was done by a crew of notvery-bright clerks hired for this

particular purpose who were told
they were copying portions of ex
isting records. Then company ex
ecutives meeting secretly would
use this cannibalized information
to support new accounts on the
company’s computer records.

Equity’s proudest boast
The proudest boast of the com
pany was that its computer did
not leave an audit trail—which it
emphatically did not. The system
had been deliberately designed so
that it did not. The original records
were there—assiduously assembled
by the group of high school clerks.
Entries had been made on the com
puter. These fake policies along
with some real ones had been sold
to reinsurers who, in most cases,
didn’t check on their authenticity
any more than anyone else had.
Why hadn’t Secrist, the ex-em
ployee who finally went to Dirks,
blown the whistle a long time earli
er? He didn’t think the insurance
commissions of the various states
would do anything. He didn’t know
too much about the SEC but he
didn’t put much faith in it either.
When he finally went to Dirks it
was in the thought of getting max
imum publicity, since that would
drive down the price of Equity
stock, the surest way to destroy the
company. Publicity also, he rea
soned would force the state insur
ance commissions to investigate,
which he wasn’t at all sure would
be the case if he went to see them
privately.
Even Dirks was skeptical at first.
It all seemed too impossible. But
he talked to the head of one of the
largest of Equity’s five sales regions
to find out how much business his
salesmen had written during the
year. He got an answer. Signifi
cantly it was far less than one fifth
of Equity’s reported earnings for
the year.
Something was obviously wrong
—in spite of the other insurance
companies, the insurance commis
sions, and the SEC—with the finan
cial reporting of the West Coast
giant.
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From that point on, it all un
raveled—but not before Dirks was
forced to change hotel rooms in
Los Angeles three times on warn
ings that “the company” was out to
get him. Perhaps the bitterest, most
poignant note of all was struck by
some unknown Equity Funding
employee who penciled an anony
mous note in a company facility:
“Thank God for Watergate!”
The Washington expose was
breaking at the same time, and at
least drew some attention away
from the Equity Funding troubles.
In general, the atmosphere that
produced both Watergate and
Equity Funding seems to be the
overwhelming note of this book.
The sheer intricacy of the maneu
verings in each case, the devious
ness of many of the characters, the
number of actors (this book has a
cast of characters at the beginning
reminiscent of a Russian novel) —
all have more than a striking sim
ilarity to each other. The distrust
of public institutions, the feeling
that those charged with public re
sponsibilities “wouldn’t do anything
about it,” also characterizes both
cases.
Product of its times

Dirks traces this to the atmo
sphere of the financial world at the
time: an era of “go-go” funds, when
a company’s stock price was its
most important asset, when corners
could be cut and most often were,
when “will it play in Peoria?” had
become a national watchword de
noting whether such and such an
act could be gotten away with or
not. Dirks himself was sued by
various interested parties for di
vulging insider information because
he had warned some friends and
accounts to take it easy in invest
ments in Equity Funding until his
investigations—at that point purely
informal — showed anything one
way or the other.
This is a complicated but thera
peutic book. Complicated because
it is difficult to follow the involved
machinations that Goldblum, Mc
Cormick, Platt, et al, devised to
July-August, 1974

fleece their company’s investors,
therapeutic in the cathartic, Freud
ian sense. It shows us where we
were just a short time ago—when
whatever would sell was good, and
honor, or honesty, was the last pos
sible consideration.

Computer Crimes by Gerald Mc
Knight, Walker and Company,
New York, 1974, 221 pages, $6.95.

The growing relegation of power
to the computer has made major
crimes by the knowledgeable easi
er, this British reporter warns. He
states the cases of some who have
slipped and been caught and pon
ders how many crooks have gotten
away leaving no traces.
If you are an expert in computer
security, don’t read this book be
cause it adds much heat but little
light. On the other hand, if you
believe your installation can’t pos
sibly be the target of any evil
force, this book may be for you. Its
style is highly readable, if a bit
sensational.
“The stakes, in the game of com
puter crime, are rising to a danger
ous level. Anyone who now stands
in the way of those determined to
operate against the electronic
world of data-processing is facing
possible reprisals from criminal
and hostile ‘investors.’ How easy it
is to overstate this threat. Equally,
it would be folly to ignore it,” Mr.
McKnight states.
He cites Alfonse Confessore as
the “first electronic criminal to be
murdered for his activities.” Mr.
Confessore was not a sinister sys
tems analyst looking to rule the
world, but a mechanic who man
aged to get hold of duplicate
Diners Club cards and pass them
on to gangsters.
But the author does tell some
interesting stories without as much
ballyhoo. The managing director of
a big and successful British drug
firm was one day approached by
a representative of his EDP depart

ment and told, “I happen to know,
sir, that if some of the men in the
computer room don’t see rises
—double what we’re getting nowright across the board, in the near
future, then your invoices are go
ing to suffer.”
If the raises were not forthcom
ing, the men proposed to reduce all
the invoices about 5 per cent. The
manager called in a computer secu
rity expert. It would be cheaper to
double the men’s salaries than to
suffer the markdown, and to bring
the matter to the authorities would
risk public confidence in the firm’s
computer-based operations. To do
the invoices manually would also
cost more than the raises and since
the accounts would have to come
out of the computer, they could be
tampered with at that stage too.
The security expert advised that
the raises be given, the invoices
be sent out, and then the whole
group fired. That was done. But
Mr. McKnight questions what
would happen if a similar sort of
action took place once computer
personnel are unionized.
“There will not, one imagines,
be the need then for vulgar black
mail. For what corporation exec
utive would be able to resist the
demands of a deputation from his
computer room if it not only pos
sessed all power over the heart
beats of the business, but also was
backed by closed-shop solidarity?
It would be like a strike of ironlung operators against polio vic
tims.”

No charges

Mr. McKnight tells of some
hardware manufacturer’s mainte
nance people who, allegedly, to
twist management’s arm in local
union negotiations, tampered with
a client’s (a life insurance com
pany) automated weather service.
No charges were preferred against
the suspects.
“From all of this, it may seem
that if one is going to sabotage a
computer for any reason, it is as
well to be a paid-up member of a
powerful union before attempting
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to do it,” the author wryly observes.
Just as charges were not pressed
by either of these two harmed com
panies, other large corporations
have kept silent about crimes com
mitted against their computer op
erations.
“Because of what competitors,
shareholders and loan-providers
such as banks, might do if they
found out that the company’s costly
computer had been broached,
those in-the-know hush up scandal
after scandal. How large a slice of
the whole it represents one can
only sense, but security experts
with sealed lips and long mem
ories talk of ‘many more than get
to be known about,’ ” Mr. Mc
Knight states.
Rewards for corruption

An EDP-knowledgeable execu
tive defrauded one company and,
to prevent a scandal, left only after
receiving additional compensation
and a letter of recommendation.
With that letter he went on to a
second company and defrauded it
too via its computer. His trail
would have continued to a third
company had he not broken the
camel’s back by asking for too much
as a going away present, the jour
nalist reports.
Mr. McKnight does offer some
comfort to his readers, “In order to
carry on a lasting, productive and
systematic robbery of credit cards,
or any other computerized sphere,
criminals would need a well-run,
well-managed operation, and this
rarely exists in their society. It
would have to be built on efficient,
corporate lines. The likelihood of
lesser, essentially hit-and-run, at
tacks is therefore very much
greater.”
Which group will win?

The author believes while some
are busily employed in making sys
tems more secure, the more greedy
individuals in our society are look
ing for ways of getting to the com
puterized information. It is a ques
tion of which group will reach its
goal first.
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Security Procedures for Com
puter Systems by Charles F.
Hemphill, Jr., and John M.
Hemphill, Dow Jones-Irwin, Inc.,
Homewood, Ill., 1973, 251 pages.
If an institution is unable to af
ford an adequate computer secu
rity system, it is unable to afford a
computer operation, these authors
state. However, before making an
investment in such a system, man
agement should first avail itself of
those basic deterrents and proce
dures that have proved effective in
actual practice, the Hemphills say
and give examples.

The Hemphills are an interesting
team. Charles F. Hemphill, Jr., has
been an FBI agent, worked on the
investigative staff of the Attorney
General of Utah, and is presently
senior consultant in the Loss Pre
vention Division, the Wackenhut
Corporation, Los Angeles. John M.
Hemphill holds a Ph.D. in electri
cal engineering and has been in
volved in the management and op
erations of several large remote ac
cess computing systems. They seem
to be the perfect pair for writing
a book on computer security.
The book they have produced is
far from technical. It provides
many examples of what not to do
and several common sense activi
ties that can keep your installation
from making the same mistakes.
A few of the sensational news
paper stories about the destruction
of data centers by students are re
peated here. Checklists are in
cluded at the end of each chapter
that can help management rate its
own security program. The book
may not give you startling new in
sights into data security, but per
haps a few of the hints will be
useful.
For instance, don’t plan your
computer facility to be located
near the firm’s safe.
“There is frequently an unusual
potential for explosion or fire in the
area of business safes. This is be
cause professional burglars some
times utilize nitroglycerine or dy
namite to blow open the safe, or

cut into it with an acetylene-burn
ing torch. Since these burglary
techniques increase the possibilities
of computer damage by explosion
or fire, it is recommended that the
computer be located at some dis
tance from a company money safe.
Since the acetylene torch is an un
usual fire hazard under any cir
cumstances, it is considered dan
gerous to allow welding in the vi
cinity of the computer.”

The great magnet hoax
What about magnets? Remember
the Wall Street Journal story that
told of a group of boy scouts tour
ing a computer center and uninten
tionally erasing company data be
cause they were carrying magnets
in their pockets? The authors point
to the Stanford Research Institute
study made in 1972 that found tape
libraries are not as vulnerable to
magnetic damage as some had
claimed. Almost any magnet can
be dangerous to computer data if
brought into direct contact with
magnetized data, but waving a
magnet in the air in the direction
of the tape library is not harmful.
However, they point out that a
tape does not have to be com
pletely erased to be useless, just the
destruction of a number of spots
can cause it to have a “read error.”
“In spite of the known dangers
of all magnetic materials, recent
business periodicals and computer
magazines still contain advertise
ments of bulletin boards and wall
charts with magnetic attachments,
for use in computer areas. These
devices utilize colorful markings
and indicators, held in place on
wallboards by magnetism. They are
described as ‘being helpful in flow
charting, book diagramming, Pert
networks, and in charting business
procedures and sales programs.’
While these devices are undoubt
edly of business value, if properly
controlled, they should be looked
on with skepticism in the computer
center,” the authors advise.
As an appendix, sample insur
ance policy forms are reproduced.
“In the final analysis, manage
ment has little choice but to utilize
Management Adviser

whatever security seems reason
able, limited only by practical ap
plication and cost. To do otherwise
is to jeopardize the very existence
of the business or institution that
relies on the computer,” the authors
conclude.

The Conscious Communicator
by John Brennan, Addison-Wes
ley Publishing Co., Reading, Mass.,
1974, 191 pages, $7.50.

The authors basic idea—very
sensible—is that good communica
tions are based on good personal
relationships, and that working re
lationships should in most respects,
therefore, resemble personal rela
tionships. Unfortunately, the author
has drowned this good idea in a
welter of overly discursive and un
organized thoughts on communi
cating and on supervising.
Books on communicating of late
years have become progressively
concerned with the human aspect
of communicating as a reaction
against the overconcern with tech
nique, and this has been all to the
good. After all, all of us spend most
of our lives “communicating” and
the kinds of communicating called
for in the business or professional
worlds are only one and not always
the most complex of the aspects of
communicating we human beings
must master to get through life.
So these books suggesting a so
lution to our business communicat
ing problems through a series of
techniques are often quite mislead
ing. Mr. Brennan’s book is gener
ally sensible about the issues and
problems of communicating and
supervising in a business environ
ment, and his chapter heads and
units are intriguing. He also has
some amusing analogies and turns
of thought as when he considers
Adam’s fall from the Garden of
Eden as described in Genesis as
an example of lack of communica
tion between Adam and the Boss
and the result: a typical Manager
over-reaction. Part One of the book
is entitled “Anyone Can Communi
July-August, 1974

cate Because Everyone is a Com
municator.” Part Two is entitled
“Organization Climate: Mysteries,
Myths and Models.” Under Part
One, we have some intriguing
titles: “In the beginning was The
Word . . . but no communication,”
“Retreat from Reality,” “The Truth
About Harry,” and “A Personal Ap
proach to Personnel Relations” and
under Part Two: “Mysteries” and
“Myths.” But, alas, the intriguing
titles and the sound idea are not
borne out in the discursive and
rather
commonplace
thoughts
which follow, and it is not clear
most of the time exactly to whom
the author is speaking, though it
appears that he is addressing mid
dle management mostly.
Mr. Brennan is a consultant in
communication and formerly man
ager-communication and public af
fairs at General Electric’s Reentry
and Environmental Systems Divi
sion in Philadelphia.
George de Mare
Communications Adviser
AICPA

Measuring Corporate Strategy by
Charles R. Ferguson, Dow JonesIrwin, Inc., Homewood, Ill., 1974,
120 pages, $9.95.
This book by a consultant ham
mers home the consultant’s eternal
theme: Problems involving tech
niques develop at a technological
level and can best be solved there.
Many serious problems, though, lie
in the basic conceptual design of
the company and are the funda
mental responsibility of top man
agement and its advisers. The basic
problem is not how to improve a
process but whether or not the
process should be performed at all,
what its true purpose is, what are
its relationships to other areas of
the corporation.

The author states his underlying
theme on the second page of his
book:
“A well-designed corporate con
ceptual framework provides the
basis around which detailed and

technical systems may be built.
This framework must be very sound
if the systems are to be sound. The
framework also produces designs of
organization structure, systems, fa
cilities, and management which are
complementary to each other in
carrying out the work of the cor
poration. Because the conceptual
framework is so basic to an effec
tively operating corporation, it
seems obvious that managers
should give careful attention to re
examining their company’s concep
tual design before shifting person
nel and before installing advanced
technology. That they do not is
evident from the frequent instances
of efforts to increase the efficiency
of functions that should never have
existed in the first place: programs
to train managers in skills they will
never need and compensation plans
paying for executive qualities that
have no value to the corporation.”
The book, which is addressed to
managers within the company
rather than consultants, suggests
that every manager consider con
ceptual design as a means of carry
ing out corporate strategy. “Strat
egy” Mr. Ferguson defines as the
scheme or plan for achieving crit
ical goals. For example, cost reduc
tion might be a critical goal for a
company. Strategies capable of
achieving this might be building
an automated plant, redesigning
the product, reorganizing the plant
management structure, or any com
bination of these. The point is that
the critical goal must be established
first, then the overall strategy for
achieving that goal. Then the sys
tems designer can come in to flesh
out the concept, to work out the
detailed plan by which it can be
made real.
Review for consultant

The author, although addressing
a hypothetical member of the man
agement team, in effect gives a
very brief overview of what every
management consultant should ask
himself when called on to do a
corporate concept audit of his
client.
Such a project may prove valu
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able even though the first approach
to implementing a strategy may not
work out. Mr. Ferguson gives as an
example:
“A manufacturer of refinery
equipment felt that in order to
reach its goals for its share of a
market it had to deal more with
the design engineers and less with
purchasing agents of its major oil
company customers. The method
used in carrying out this strategy
was quite simply: to be more ag
gressive in making direct contact
with the engineers and to get to
know them better. Instead of im
proving the company’s position, it
worsened it by alienating both the
purchasing agents and the engi
neers. The strategy was made to
work by creating a highly special
ized engineering and research
group inside the company which
could aid the customer design engi
neers in refinery design. The cus
tomer engineers recognized the
value of the specialized design as
sistance they were able to get and
requested assistance from the com
pany’s personnel, providing the
contact needed at a critical stage
in the competition for individual
jobs.”

Good strategy, poor tactics

Here the critical goal, gaining a
larger share of the market, and the
strategy for achieving it, getting a
closer working relationship with
customer engineers, proved valid.
Only the first system developed,
direct contact with company engi
neers, was at fault. The creation of
an engineering and research group
inside the manufacturing company
which could aid customer engi
neers, and the overall strategy
worked out well.
After defining his interpretation
of a concept audit, Mr. Ferguson
shows how such an audit might be
conducted in five major areas of
concern to management: the organ
ization structure, management it
self, management compensation, re
source allocation and management,
and, finally, the total corporation.
This book will reveal nothing
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new to experienced management
consultants, but it may give them
a few good ideas and it certainly
gives them some convenient check
lists. Perhaps its greatest value may
lie in its potential as a gift to re
luctant clients who are quite sure
they don’t have any problems a
computer installation can’t solve.

Affirmative Action for Women:
A Practical Guide by Dorothy
Jongeward, Dru Scott, and Con
tributors, Addison-Wesley Publish
ing Co., Reading, Mass., 1973, 334
pages, $8.95.
A practical “how to” guide, this
hook is on target in showing how
managers and employees, of both
sexes, can better utilize the talents
of the 51 per cent of our popula
tion who are women.
Women are beginning to take
new roles in many organizations—
including stepping into jobs tradi
tionally labeled “men’s work.” It is
no longer a question of should
women work or will women work
but what can organizations do to
provide equal opportunities for
women. More and more women are
entering the labor market and, in
light of recently passed Federal
and state laws dealing with dis
crimination in employment, most
larger organizations are faced with
the problem of establishing affirma
tive action programs to provide
equal employment opportunities for
women.
The book is a well-written, prac
tical, and to-the-point collection of
facts, workable concepts, com
ments, programs, and articles giv
ing some insight and guidelines as
to what useful courses of action
organizations can take in imple
menting affirmative action plans.
Practical steps for positive change
are stressed. Specifically, it outlines
what organizations need to do and
are able to do in their Equal Em
ployment Opportunity programs
and also tells what they can do to
assure corporate rights according

to the new legislation. It is also a
book for individual women now
working or planning to work in or
ganizations and offers original con
tributions from people actively in
volved in successful affirmative ac
tion programs.
In addition to describing how to
organize and present affirmative
action seminars for managers and
supervisors and counseling semi
nars for career women, included is:
(1) a clear interpretation of the
laws affecting organizations and
women, (2) the current place of
women in government service and
in organized religion, and (3) the
unique problems of black women
in organizations.
The seminar program developed
and implemented by the Bank of
America is described in detail.
The book, as was the intent in
its design, should be a helpful ref
erence source rather than a coverto-cover reader.

Give & Take: The Complete
Guide to Negotiating Strategies
and Tactics by Chester L. Kar
rass, Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
New York, 1974, 280 pages, $8.95.

This is a handbook, a set of rules
to follow when in the process of
negotiating an agreement, whether
it be for the sale of a used car or
a delicate diplomatic agreement be
tween Israelis and Arabs.
According to the author, whose
book jacket proclaims that he has
“more than twenty years of major
company buying and selling expe
rience,” the same techniques of
playing from strength apply in each
negotiating situation. There is al
ways something someone wants
and someone else wants—or at least
is willing—to sell. How to find the
common meeting ground?
This book considers almost every
possible combination of circum
stances that might arise in bar
gaining sessions and gives advice
on how to deal with each. Some
of the possible circumstances that
Management Adviser

might arise are so simplistic they
sound ludicrous; anyone with ordi
nary common sense should be able
to foresee them and cope with
them on his own. Others are more
subtle and the advice given, though
rudimentary in nature, is sensible.
The great advantage of the book
is precisely its nature as a hand
book. Each possible situation is en
compassed in one brief example,
usually no more than a page in
length. Look up the situation you
anticipate facing before your meet
ing and you go prepared for what
ever the opposition may face you
with.
Except, perhaps, the most in
tangible of all: Knowledge of the
subject and all its nuances. The
author pays lip service to this idea
and in no case discounts knowing
everything possible about the sub
ject. But the idea of anyone enter
ing diplomatic negotiations armed
with only the advice rendered by
this book is a little chilling. Better
try it out on selling your car first.

Briefly listed
Guide to Corporations: A Social
Perspective by the Council on
Economic Priorities, The Swallow
Press Incorporated, Chicago, 1974,
395 pages, $4.95.

How 43 corporations (in the chem
ical, automobile, steel, oil, paper,
and airline industries) deal with
the environment, equal opportu
nitv, military contracting, and in
vestment in Southern Africa.

MAGAZINES
Computer Models for Investment
Analysis by Howard F. Blasch,
Donald L. Struve, and Narain D.
Bhatia, Management Controls, De
cember, 1973.

As companies become more in
volved in investment activities,
there is an increasing need for an
alysts to be able to make rapid and
accurate comparisons and evalua
tions as a basis for management de-
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cisions. This article describes how
this need can be met by the use of
a time-shared computer model
known as PACE—Project Analysis
by Computer Evaluation. The
model
substantially
overcomes
many of the limitations of tradi
tional methods of analyzing the fi
nancial aspects of investment pro
posals.

A typical analysis of an invest
ment or project involves simulta
neous consideration of several sets
of factors such as financing alter
natives, tax implications, cash
flows, and measures of project per
formance. All of these items are in
corporated within the PACE
model.
General steps

The usual steps to be taken
when the PACE model is adopted
include the following:
1. A description of the project is
put together. The uncertain rev
enues, expenses, interest rates, sal
vage values, etc., are identified and
a range of values established where
possible.
2. The project is discussed with
a PACE model specialist to deter
mine the most effective way of for
mulating the problem to minimize
the cost of collecting raw data and
conducting the analysis.
3. The data are collected and
critical assumptions are reviewed.
4. The data are entered and set
up on the project file. Initial re
ports are then produced on-line
and tested for reasonableness.
5. A sensitivity analysis is con
ducted wherein “what if” questions
are asked. At this stage, the thrust
of analysis moves away from com
putation to generation and evalua
tion of new alternatives as well as
quantification exposure under dif
ferent assumptions.
Time-phased cash flows

The investment project itself is
completely specified by timephased cash flows into and out of
the project, taking into account
58

various financial, accounting, and
tax parameters. PACE model in
puts include operating cash flows
(revenues, expenses, and working
capital), asset purchase cash flows,
depreciation policies, types of fi
nancing, and tax information.
These project data are entered into
the model by responding at the
time-sharing terminal to a sequence
of requests from the program.
Model outputs

The outputs of the model include
cash flow statements, income state
ments, depreciation schedules, fi
nancial repayments, and project
evaluators such as net present
value, yield, cumulative cash flow,
and return on investment.
The flexibility of the PACE
model makes it applicable to a
wide variety of situations such as
the evaluation of venture capital
and loans, real estate promotion,
syndication alternatives, financing
alternatives, and lease vs. buy de
cisions. It allows for sound busi
ness judgment backed by speed
and accuracy in quantitative an
alysis.
Richard Boes
Michigan State University

In Praise of Those Who Leave
by Saul W. Gellerman, The Con
ference Board Record, March, 1974.

Personnel turnover is usually
considered a headache to most or
ganizations, but is it the monster
it appears?
A number of distinct advantages
accrue to the business with high
turnover rates, the author points
out. When a vacancy arises, man
agement may fill it with a better
trained, better qualified person
while offering an opportunity for
dissatisfied, and often under-pro
ductive, employees to find work
elsewhere.
Turnover also offers financial ad
vantages. Ordinarily, the longer an

employee remains with the organi
zation, the smaller his increases in
productivity. Thus, management
may be paying more and more for
less and less. A high turnover rate
alleviates this problem by encour
aging employees to leave before
their salary begins to rise faster
than their productivity. High turn
over also reduces pension fund
costs when the benefits do not vest
in the employee. The additional
funds created when an employee
leaves could be used to increase
benefits for the more productive
employees, or effect a cost savings
to the company.

Turnover benefits
High turnover may enhance a
company’s “employment image.”
To increase their marketability,
graduates often seek the employer
who offers the best training pro
gram. After they have gained the
necessary expertise, these employ
ees may look for employment else
where at a higher salary. But both
parties will have benefited—man
agement gets to examine the new
talent while the employee receives
his desired training.
Finally, high turnover is econom
ically beneficial since it promotes
a more efficient allocation of
labor resources. In a labor market
with fewer obstacles, men can
more easily shift to positions where
their productivity is greatest.

Groups with greatest turnover
Employee turnover is concen
trated in two groups: young people
(under age 30) and middle-aged
people (age 35-45). High volun
tary turnover among youths is pri
marily attributed to the qualities
of youth itself—the wanderlust, no
permanent commitments, and the
fact that youths usually get the
least desired assignments. Turn
over in this group can be expected
to remain relatively stable since
these conditions will most likely re
main unchanged.
But higher turnover among the
middle-aged is a different matter.
Management Adviser

As the average age of the popula
tion increases, more employees will
enter this age group causing even
higher turnover.
Three “stable” groups

Who, then, are the employees
who remain? Generally, they can
be divided into three groups: (1)
the “umbilical” types who will
never leave before retirement; (2)
the contented person who could
become discontented; and (3) the
reluctant type who really would
like to leave, but hasn’t a better
offer. Of these three, the “reluc
tants” are the most important to
management since they could most
easil✓y become defectors.

Identifying “reluctants”
Management should attempt to
identify reluctants and classify
them into one of the following
three categories: replaceable, un
clear, or irreplaceable. Most per
sonnel are “replaceables” and
should be allowed to leave. Only
when the company is failing to re
cover training costs should it at
tempt to reduce turnover of “re
placeables.” The second category,
the “unclear” group, should include
those with conflicting evidence in
their performance report. But the
third group, the “irreplaceables,” is
the one where management should
concentrate its efforts. “Irreplace
ables” should be actively recruited.
After an “irreplaceable” defects, in
formal ties should be maintained
to determine his progress in his
new position, and if he becomes
dissatisfied with his new job, the
company may wish to reacquire his
talents.
A high turnover rate is here to
stay: for this reason, companies
should manage it as effectively as
possible. The system in use today
discourages turnover. Instead of
enticing many lackadaisical, “re
placeables” to stay, management
should encourage employees to ex
amine their future with the organi
zation. When the employment ar
rangement becomes unsatisfactory
to either party, the employee
July-August, 1974

should be encouraged to look for
work elsewhere.
Management should actively
promote policies which support
this point of view. Fully-vested,
portable pensions should be con
sidered. Salaries should be tied to
productivity with only the “irre
placeable” receiving more than the
going pay rate. Voluntary turnover
should be carefully managed, de
partures timed to coincide with
the termination dates of large con
tracts and replacements recruited
to fill the vacancy. Perhaps even a
placement service could be main
tained to relocate dissatisfied per
sonnel.
All of these policies help create
a healthy attitude toward turnover.
Employees dissatisfied with their
work should not be enticed to re
main. Why burden the organiza
tion with disgruntled, underpro
ductive workers when talented, en
thusiastic workers may be recruited
to fill their places? Turnover can
be managed effectively, Mr. Gellerman concludes.
Don Dozier
University of Missouri

Foreign Markets—Another and
Closer Look by J. Russell Dow
ney, Management Controls, June,
1973.
Many companies are capable of
exploiting the opportunities avail
able in foreign markets, but hold
back in the mistaken belief that
such operations are beyond their
capabilities. This article notes spe
cific credit services available
through the Export-Import Bank
of the United States (Eximbank)
and outlines other considerations
relevant to entering foreign mar
kets.

Eximbank has a broad range of
programs designed to promote for
eign operations. It operates a direct
lending program in cooperation
with private financial institutions
whereby the buyer may finance up
to 90 per cent of the purchase

through Eximbank and a commer
cial bank. Eximbank will usually
take the later maturities, thus en
abling the commercial bank to be
repaid first; because Eximbank’s in
terest rates are generally lower, the
overall cost to the borrower is re
duced. This direct lending program
is intended mainly for financing
large capital equipment sales with
long-term repayment schedules.
Guarantees foreign notes

Under the Exporter Guarantee
Program, Eximbank will guarantee
the repayment of foreign pur
chasers’ notes to commercial banks
which have financed foreign sales
of U.S. suppliers. The Eximbank
guarantee covers both commercial
and political risks, thereby en
abling the American supplier to en
joy the benefit of cash sales. The
Exporter Insurance Program pro
vides similar protection against
nonpayment for the exporter who
wishes to supply his own credit.
Financing exports is facilitated
by the Discount Loan Program
under which Eximbank lends com
mercial banks up to 100 per cent
of the value of their export paper.
This program assures commercial
banks that export financing will not
adversely affect their liquidity even
during periods of high interest
rates and liquidity shortages.
The Cooperative Financing Fa
cility Program provides credit fi
nancing primarily for small- and
medium-size firms which may lack
experience in foreign credit financ
ing. Through this program, Exim
bank will arrange with private for
eign financial institutions to jointly
finance purchases from U.S. firms.
For the firm contemplating its
financing needs pursuant to mak
ing foreign sales, Eximbank will
at no cost specify the nature, the
amount, the terms, and the condi
tions of support it will provide. To
add flexibility this service is offered
with no binding commitment on
the part of the firm; Eximbank’s
commitment can be used in total,
in part, or not at all.
In addition to credit serviced
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through Eximbank, the Department
of Commerce provides information
on exports by commodity and
product lines through its Bureau of
International Commerce. Similar
statistics on population, industry
growth rates, and exports and im
ports are available through govern
ment ministries of most foreign
countries seeking American tech
nology and other products.
Prerequisite for investments

Mr. Downey notes that foreign
operations should be undertaken
only after comprehensive market
studies by analysts familiar with
the environment. For those firms
contemplating direct foreign invest
ment, familiarity with labor and
other laws and U.S. and foreign
taxes is particularly important. The
Foreign Trade and Investment Act,
the Office of Foreign Direct Invest
ments of the Commerce Depart
ment, and the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act also apply to U.S. companies
operating abroad. And because
foreign financing markets vary con
siderably, knowledge of relevant
practices is needed with regard to
interest rates, utilization of over
drafts, and other financial practices.
Although the considerations are
many and complex, the opportuni
ties seem to outweigh the obstacles
as evidenced by the continued
growth of foreign operations.
Tom Harrison
Michigan State University

Accounting and Behavioral Sci
ence: Some Interrelationships
by Clark E. Chastain, Michigan
CPA, November-December, 1972.
In recent years, interest has
grown in the implications of the
behavioral sciences for accounting.
This article provides a survey of
the area, including definitions of
terms and topics of current interest.

Clark Chastain has provided us
with a very intelligible and provoc
ative discussion of the relationship
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between accounting and the be
havioral sciences. He has examined
some of the key issues involving
accounting and the behavioral sci
ences, and has concluded that
accounting researchers and practi
tioners must be acquainted with,
use, and incorporate findings from
the behavioral sciences.
The remarkable correspondence
between the history of accounting
and the behavioral sciences is
brought out in the first section of
the article. The initial writings on
human behavior and the initial
practice of accounting concurrently
occurred around 5,000 B.C. Both
accounting and the behavioral sci
ences became formal disciplines in
the nineteenth century. But despite
their parallel development, ac
counting benefited little from the
behavioral sciences until the twen
tieth century.
Following the lead of the man
agement profession, in the 1950’s
the accounting profession began to
recognize the impact of human and
social factors on accounting. Inter
est accelerated throughout the
1950’s and 1960’s and included re
search on the behavioral conse
quences of accounting actions
(such as budgets and audits) and
calls for the training of accountants
in the behavioral disciplines.

Natures of various sciences
The natures and interrelation
ships of science in general, the so
cial sciences, the behavioral sci
ences, and accounting are dis
cussed in the next section. Science
is defined as a body of systematic
knowledge while the social sci
ences are sciences concerned with
the activities of man. The behavi
oral sciences are those social sci
ences concerned with the behavior
of man and are usually limited to
the core disciplines of anthropol
ogy, psychology, and sociology.
Whether management is a behavi
oral science and whether account
ing is a social science are issues in
much dispute, but the need for the
application of the core behavioral
sciences to both management and
accounting is unquestionable.

The behavioral sciences are rele
vant to accounting on both the in
put and output sides. On the input
side, accountants measure aspects
of human behavior. Individual
transactions are the result of hu
man actions, and overall perform
ance measures, such as income, are
the measures of the cumulative be
havior of individuals or groups. On
the output side, accounting meas
ures, such as those found in finan
cial statements, influence behavior
in both anticipated and unantici
pated ways. Thus far, the major im
plications of the behavioral sciences
for accounting have been to dis
cover these unanticipated conse
quences and modify accounting
measures to better achieve organi
zation goals.

Clinging to obsolete
Chastain discusses many of the
implications of the behavioral sci
ences for accounting. Because of
the behavioral impact of account
ing, he argues that accounting
should extend its scope to the com
munication of nonfinancial as well
as financial information. Much of
the literature on behavioral science
applications to accounting concerns
the failure of accounting controls
to effectively motivate employees
to accomplish organization goals.
Accountants and designers of ac
counting control systems are ac
cused of making obsolete assump
tions about the behavioral conse
quences of accounting measures or
even failing to consider these con
sequences. Such failures have re
sulted in much hostility directed
towards accountants. In addition,
the failure to produce accounting
measures which facilitate adjust
ment of organizations to changing
environmental conditions results
from accountants’ clinging to the
obsolete closed-system concept of
organizations.
All of the above lead to Chas
tain’s conclusion that accountants
must be knowledgeable in and uti
lize behavioral science findings.
Kenneth Rosenzweig
Michigan State University
Management Adviser

